Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules by Ferejohn, John & Friedman, Barry
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 3 Article 11
2006
Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default
Rules
John Ferejohn
johnf@ghj.com
Barry Friedman
ngfid@gm.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2006) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol33/iss3/11
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
TOWARD A POLITICAL THEORY OF  
CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES 
 
John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 33 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPRING 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 3
 
Recommended citation: John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of 
Constitutional Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825 (2006).  
 TOWARD A POLITICAL THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES 
JOHN FEREJOHN & BARRY FRIEDMAN* 
 I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................  825 
 II. POLITICAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES ............................  828 
A. The Normative Complexity of Constitutional Defaults..............................  828 
B. Political Theory, Contestability, and Constitutional Defaults ..................  833 
C. The Structure of Constitutional Default Rules ..........................................  837 
 III. THE INEVITABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES: A TYPOLOGY.........  838 
A. Substantive Constitutional Rules and Mandatory Contract Rules ...........  838 
B. Majoritarian Default Rules........................................................................  840 
C. Penalty Defaults: Forcing Information and Deliberation..........................  845 
D. Normative, Transformative and Model Defaults.......................................  850 
E. Structural Defaults ....................................................................................  853 
 IV. POSITIVE THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES ..............................  854 
A. Transaction Costs and Bargaining Models ...............................................  855 
B. Majoritarian and Penalty Defaults Reexamined .......................................  856 
 V. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  859 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The question we explore here is whether “default rule thinking” can 
enlighten the theory or practice of constitutional law. Such thinking is 
prevalent in private law scholarship, particularly that regarding con-
tractual relations. There, numerous commentators have explored the 
notion that some legal rules are not absolute restrictions on what par-
ties may do, but may be set aside by them (or “contracted around”) in 
certain circumstances.1 Our intention here is to provide a first cut at 
seeing constitutional law through this distinctive lens. As is the case 
with all such first cuts, we are certain there are many places for elabo-
ration and improvement on what we have done.  
 We begin by noting that good reasons for skepticism exist about 
such a project. In contract theory itself, recent scholarship seems less 
enamored of the idea of default rules than it was some years ago. 
Alan Schwartz has expressed doubt about discovering generally ap-
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 1. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (“Default rules fill the gaps in 
incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them.”); Alan 
Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390 (1993) (“[A] default rule can be defined as a rule that parties are 
free to change.”).  
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plicable default rules that should apply across the whole contractual 
domain, both because that domain is too diverse and because the 
normal range of informational problems are too difficult (for contrac-
tors as well as for courts).2 He thinks that general contract law there-
fore has few such rules and that fewer still remain to be discovered, 
though he is more sanguine about the utility of default rules in such 
narrower contexts as corporate law or employment law. Eric Posner 
has argued that default rule thinking has not really been very pro-
ductive in the contracts area.3 He argues it not only fails to describe 
contracts doctrine—because it usually shows how existing doctrine is 
inefficient in various ways—but its normative recommendations are 
either vague or unusable.4 
 Deeper reasons for skepticism arise from the difficulty of applying 
default rule thinking in the public realm. Formally, the notion of de-
fault rules would seem to have little application to the Constitution, 
which commonly is understood as relatively obdurate given the un-
wieldy Article V procedures. Theoretically, while the private law do-
main is centrally concerned with regulating voluntary transactions 
that have limited third-party effects, public law essentially is centered 
on coercive laws enacted by majorities or administrative fiat. The Con-
stitution is a limitation on what officials can do; it was put in place to 
protect individual liberty. The very notion that public officials may 
change or override certain constitutional protections may seem, on this 
account, simply incoherent as a view of constitutional law.  
 Even more problematically, the “parties” to a constitutional trans-
action do not negotiate with one another to get around a default in 
the same way as contracting parties do. Rather, a rule is in place, 
and the government acts. If challenged, a court later determines if 
the government action meets constitutional scrutiny. Not only does 
the fact that government is the primary and often sole actor create 
distributional difficulties that we discuss below, but it deprives the 
default rule idea of its common structure. When we speak of default 
rules in constitutional law, we typically are talking about specifica-
tions of ways the government can act (or modify its behavior) to get 
around a constitutional prohibition.5  
                                                                                                                      
 2. See generally Schwartz, supra note 1, at 390 (Default rule “scholarship is illumi-
nating but less helpful than it could be . . . [because] there are several types of default 
rules but the literature does not distinguish adequately among them . . . .”). 
 3. See generally Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Dec-
ades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003).  
 4. See id. at 830 (“[T]he predictions of [contract] models are indeterminate, and the 
normative recommendations derived from them are implausible.”). 
 5. This difficulty is somewhat alleviated if we see courts as a party to constitutional 
transaction. In that case, the government takes an act which will stand if courts do not 
overturn it. See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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 As trenchant as these criticisms are, however, we believe the de-
fault rule paradigm remains valuable conceptually as a way to char-
acterize the structure and practice of contract law (even if it does not 
actually deliver new default rules), and such conceptual clarity may 
be useful in the constitutional domain as well.6 Our focus here is on 
judicial interpretations of the Constitution. Common wisdom is that 
judicial decisions represent relatively rigid rules, in that they are 
subject to displacement only by judicial overruling or successful use 
of the Article V amendment procedures. Here, we challenge common 
wisdom, demonstrating that judicial decisions frequently create de-
fault rather than mandatory rules, thereby providing opportunities 
for political actors to displace those rules.7 Moreover, because virtu-
ally every mandatory constitutional rule involves rejection of a de-
fault alternative, the decision to employ a default is made tacitly if 
not explicitly. Better to bring this sort of thinking to the surface, so 
that the difficult normative choices involved are themselves explicit. 
The central point we hope to establish is that not only is default rule 
thinking useful with regard to those judicial rules, but it is practi-
cally unavoidable.   
 Part II examines serious normative difficulties that attend any ef-
fort to bring default rule thinking to constitutional law. The most ba-
sic questions central to any default regime are fraught with norma-
tive complexity when asked in the public law context. For example, 
while efficiency provides a clear metric for assessing rules of contract 
law, the normative basis for constitutional rules is both varied and 
contestable. In light of this normative complexity, how is one then to 
know whether a default rule is appropriate, let alone the circum-
stances under which it can be contracted around? What are the stan-
dards by which such a rule is to be evaluated? Who, even, are the 
parties that may contract around a default rule? 
 Part III proceeds to explain that despite the complexity of these 
questions, they must be pursued because default rules are pervasive 
and likely inevitable in constitutional law. Part III provides a typol-
ogy of constitutional default rules, tracking roughly the categories 
and definitions of defaults commonly identified in the contracts lit-
                                                                                                                      
 6. For a similar—but far more extensive—project directed at judicial statutory in-
terpretation, see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2162 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting]; Einer Elhauge, Preference-
Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, 
Preference-Estimating]. Elhauge offers both a descriptive and normative account of the use 
of default rules in statutory interpretation, and accounts, among other things, for many of 
the canons of interpretation. 
 7. If political actors do create a new rule then, as we discuss, courts faced with a 
challenge to the new policy must accede to that creation either by letting it stand as a mat-
ter of substance or by refusing jurisdiction to permit its contest. See infra note 15 and ac-
companying text. 
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erature. Again, we pay primary attention to rules established by ju-
dicial decisions construing the Constitution.  
 Part IV then provides a tangible example of how rigorous applica-
tion of default rule thinking in the constitutional area can have a 
normative payoff. Our focus here is on application of positive political 
theory regarding pivot points and legislative gridlock to two promi-
nent types of default rules, majoritarian and penalty defaults. Seeing 
constitutional rules as defaults necessarily requires asking how they 
can be contracted around. Our application of positive theory explains 
how default rule thinking can be used to enhance the democratic 
pedigree of constitutional decisions. 
II.   POLITICAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES 
 Constitutional and contract law differ in important ways regard-
ing both their normative commitments and the way they are opera-
tionalized. Those differences complicate default rule thinking in the 
constitutional realm enormously. Answers to even the most basic of 
questions are contested, and the values that would inform default 
thinking are diverse and controversial and do not always yield con-
sistent answers in individual cases. This Part details the array of 
complex considerations that come to bear once default thinking is 
moved into the public arena.  
A.   The Normative Complexity of Constitutional Defaults 
 To get a theory of default rules off the ground, there are certain 
basic issues that need to be resolved. A normative theory of default 
rules requires (1) a specification of who is to set the defaults, (2) a 
specification of who is entitled to negotiate around the defaults, and 
(3) a standard or objective according to which actions can be evalu-
ated. Although contract law rests on certain premises rooted in po-
litical theory, that theory is straightforward enough that these ques-
tions have fairly apparent answers. That is not the case in constitu-
tional theory. 
 To begin, no question in constitutional theory may be of longer-
running contest than who is entitled to put the constitutional default 
rule in place. In contract law, the default rules are put in place by 
judges or legislators. That is not the case in constitutional law. Obvi-
ously, the people retain the ultimate capacity to set default rules— 
as they did during foundational moments such as the time period of 
1787-1788, or following the Civil War. Such authority is exercised 
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through the medium of the states as established in Article V.8 But 
given the difficulty of amending the Constitution, the familiar prac-
tice of judicial review gives primacy to courts in this regard. In the-
ory, at least, the judicial establishment of constitutional rules sticks, 
subject only to judicial overruling or constitutional amendment. We 
intend to sidestep the controversy over judicial review here,9 taking 
the practice as a given. We also highlight but walk past the analytic 
question of whether the Article V amendment is, at this point in 
time, a mechanism for contracting around, or for putting a new con-
stitutional rule (which may be either a default or mandatory rule) in 
place. Rather, focusing solely on judicial review, what we come to 
show in Part III is that constitutional law is shot through with de-
fault rules, which can be overturned far more easily and by many 
more actors than constitutional theory about judicial review typically 
would suggest.  
 Taking the judicial establishment of default rules as a given, the 
second question is, Who is entitled to displace those default rules? 
This raises a thorny question of who are the parties to a constitu-
tional “transaction” empowered to contract around a default rule.10  
In contracting, the parties are two or more private entities that have 
determined to make a deal they believe to be utility maximizing. Ju-
dicial and other contract rules serve as background to the transac-
tion, but in the rubric of default rule thinking, the parties to the deal 
can contract around existing background norms.11 In most cases once 
they do so, the deal proceeds and rarely returns to court for further 
scrutiny of the parties’ choices.  
 A sort of parallel to the private transaction is not unheard of in 
the public law realm, but it is not the typical case. It is true that one 
party—the government—may wish to do something, and with consti-
tutional requirements in the background, might “contract” with pri-
vate parties. Aware of the prohibition of taking property without just 
                                                                                                                      
 8. See U.S. CONST. art. V (Proposed amendments “shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of 
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof.”).  
 9. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (“For decades, le-
gal academics have struggled with the countermajoritarian difficulty: the problem of justi-
fying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable judges in 
what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy.”); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme 
Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001). 
 10. For a similar distinction in a different context, see Tamar Frankel, What Default 
Rules Teach Us About Corporations; What Understanding Corporations Teaches Us About 
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 703-13 (2006). Frankel distinguishes between 
private and public contracts, finds certain corporate law provisions “public” in nature be-
cause of, inter alia, third party effects, and recognizes the fact that there are more “parties” 
to the transaction than those formally part of the contract. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 87 (“Default rules fill the gaps in in-
complete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them.”).  
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compensation,12 the government wishing to condemn property might 
approach a property holder and make an offer. The deal might be 
consummated after further negotiation. Similarly, the government 
might have reason to wish to search private space. Aware of the 
strictures of the Fourth Amendment, the government might negoti-
ate to conduct a consent search.13 More commonly, though, in a con-
stitutional transaction the government decides to utilize its coercive 
power, and private entities feel the force of that authority. How does 
default rule thinking apply in this more common case? 
 In the typical constitutional transaction, the parties are better 
understood to be the composite actors who ultimately hold the au-
thority to contract around a constitutional default rule. If, as we ex-
plain below, courts put in place prohibition X, which can potentially 
be worked around by solution X•, then the relevant parties are those 
with authority to put X• in place. That might be the legislature, com-
posed of many individual legislators who will negotiate with one an-
other to adopt X•; it might be the members of an independent execu-
tive agency; and so on.  
 Even when one focuses solely on the government party to the 
transaction, which governmental entity is the relevant one may itself 
be subject to contest. In American political theory, the power of the 
state is divided vertically and horizontally among governmental ac-
tors in at least two ways. The execution of governmental power is 
understood to be both politically and administratively divisible be-
tween the states and the federal government and is, in fact, divided 
along these lines.14 State authority is further devolved to local enti-
ties. At each level there are still further divisions along horizontal 
lines, the separation of powers model being most familiar, perhaps, 
though variants exist particularly at the local level. In formulating 
any given default rule, then, the question of which level of govern-
ment may displace it is itself subject to contention. 
 Moreover, it is necessary to regard courts themselves as parties in 
the constitutional domain and not as actors external to the transac-
                                                                                                                      
 12. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
 13. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated.”); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (“In situations where 
the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, 
a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and 
reliable evidence.”). 
 14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.”); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) (“Al-
though the States surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they 
retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’ ” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 
(James Madison))). 
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tions. The reason for this is that if a constitutional actor or actors at-
tempt to put a new rule in place, courts are ordinarily open to hear 
challenges to that rule. Indeed, the ubiquity of third-party effects in 
state action makes the availability of opportunities to challenge gov-
ernmental action an imperative of political morality. A new rule need 
not be challenged in the courts, but parties still tend to negotiate 
about the new rule in the shadow of potential judicial review. Of 
course, courts can and sometimes do duck constitutional challenges 
on jurisdictional grounds.15 
 Finally, what is the metric by which constitutional default rules 
might be judged? In contract theory, efficiency plays the normative 
role in choosing among default rules16 (with perhaps a cameo part for 
some notion of justice). There are, of course, various efficiency con-
cepts that could be employed, ranging from austere Pareto efficiency 
to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, and any specific notion of efficiency 
counts as a political theory in the sense that each has distinct dis-
tributive implications. Those who put contract rules in place are 
thought to pick rules that will induce efficient contracting behavior: 
to arrange background conditions so that contractors will agree to ef-
ficient contracts, make appropriate investments, disclose information 
where appropriate, and fulfill contractual obligations when they 
should.17 Sometimes efficiency may require that parties negotiate ex-
plicit contractual terms that fit their actual circumstance rather than 
relying on default presumptions.18  
 Efficiency works in two ways; in the normal case, parties are left 
free to enter into voluntary arrangements as long as there are not 
significant effects on other parties. Presumably they would not ra-
tionally enter into a contract unless each expected to gain by it. So 
long as there are no significant effects on third parties, voluntary 
agreements presumptively increase efficiency. The substantive value 
of efficiency is achieved by putting in place certain procedures that 
                                                                                                                      
 15. See generally Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (side-
stepping, on jurisdictional grounds, the constitutionality of a teacher-led recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance, holding that the father lacked prudential standing to bring action in 
federal court).  
 16. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 93. With efficiency as the underlying 
goal, Ayres and Gertner suggest that “penalty defaults are appropriate when it is cheaper 
for the parties to negotiate a term ex ante than for the courts to estimate ex post what the 
parties would have wanted.” Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 390-92 (recognizing that multiple categories of 
default rules are necessary for efficient contracting, some of which are designed to remedy 
informational disparities while others aim to provide terms to the contract favorable to 
both parties to encourage fulfillment of the obligations therein). 
 18. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 91 (introducing “penalty” default rules, 
which are default rules “purposefully set at what the parties would not want—in order to 
encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties” and accord-
ingly negotiate explicit contractual terms).  
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ensure the voluntary consent of the contracting parties. Second, as 
much recent work in the area has shown even in the standard bilat-
eral case, appropriately chosen default rules can remove imperfec-
tions that arise from informational asymmetries (as well as other 
kinds of market imperfections) by inducing the parties to disclose 
private information.19 Thus, while parties act voluntarily, default 
rules can be chosen to induce efficient action. Obviously, such rules 
may also be chosen to achieve distributional objectives as well.20  
 Put this way, it is clear that contractual doctrine and default rule 
thinking are not devoid of political/normative aspects. But that the-
ory seems implicit and more or less natural to the normal contractual 
setting. The political theory that seems most in evidence is one that 
sustains a picture of robustly independent contractors, fairly evenly 
matched in bargaining abilities and external options, who can be 
trusted for the most part to agree only to things that are in their in-
terests as they see them.21 Certainly, one can worry that this model 
may apply uncomfortably to more asymmetric contracting such as 
the standard form, fine print-dominated, opt-out contracting between 
retailers and their customers, and worry that some players are con-
fused or overmatched in contractual settings. But these are treated 
as peripheral cases rather than the core of contract theory.22 At 
minimum then the voluntaristic starting point of contracts privileges 
both the precontractual status quo and the background or default 
rules that govern the way a contract will be understood in court. In 
view of this, the normative theory of default rules asks which extra-
contractual default or background conditions will lead contractors to 
behave well (that is, enter into efficient contracts and not do egre-
giously unfair things to their partners).  
 In constitutional law, the range of normative values that may be 
applicable to appraising outcomes is both wider and more controver-
sial than is the case in the contractual setting. Nothing resembling a 
voluntaristic starting point can be privileged in the political realm: 
people are not free to leave or stay out of collective affairs; others will 
act for them and to them in any case. A natural starting point must 
deal with the unavoidability of coercion and mutual interference.  
                                                                                                                      
 19. See id. at 97-104.  
 20. See id. (arguing for penalty default rules as a means of encouraging the distribu-
tion of information); see also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 390-91 (suggesting that “informa-
tion-forcing” default rules work to encourage the distribution of information from sophisti-
cated parties to unsophisticated parties).  
 21. See Posner, supra note 3, at 842 (explaining that rational parties to a contract “en-
ter contracts only when it is in their self-interest, and . . . will agree only to terms that 
make them better off”).  
 22. See id. at 842-45 (recognizing that while contracts are usually enforced, some-
times courts refuse to enforce contracts because of unequal bargaining power or asymmet-
rical information). 
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 Thus, default thinking in constitutional law immediately con-
fronts the question of what principles justify the inevitable govern-
ment interference with private ordering. We take this question up 
below but note that even the sources of such principles are controver-
sial and contested. Some principles apt for this circumstance are 
found, not surprisingly, in the Constitution itself. But throughout 
history a diverse set of additional texts—including the Federalist 
Papers,23 the Declaration of Independence,24 and the Gettysburg Ad-
dress25—have contributed values of which constitutional law takes 
account. Constitutional norms also are located in broader notions of 
democracy, popular sovereignty, and the rule of law, as well as vari-
ous theories of justice, all unquestionably related to our constitu-
tional tradition but lacking any precise or definite location in it.26 
B.   Political Theory, Contestability, and Constitutional Defaults 
 Each of the questions we discuss above is deeply contested in the 
constitutional realm. Each has been the subject of a vast literature. 
In order to demonstrate that complexity, we briefly examine just one 
of those questions: What set of norms ought to govern the use of de-
fault rules in constitutional law? 
 We indicated above that it is usually not important to focus on po-
litical (that is, distributional) aspects of contracting. Except in periph-
eral cases, efficiency considerations provide the relevant normative 
judgments. Default rules may raise distributional issues more explic-
itly because—especially in asymmetric settings—such rules can have 
nonnegligible distributive consequences, but for the most part, these 
consequences are subordinated to the pursuit of efficiency and not 
pursued for their own value.27 Obviously third-party effects complicate 
this in some subset of cases, but the normal or paradigm case of con-
tract is one in which contractors are symmetrically situated, third-
                                                                                                                      
 23. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) in support of the 
constitutional principle of checks and balances).  
 24. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 255 (2003) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the Declaration of Independence in support 
of the proposition that money is speech and that campaign expenditures are constitution-
ally protected under the First Amendment). 
 25. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2004) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring) (citing President Lincoln’s reference to God in his famous Gettysburg Ad-
dress as support for the constitutionality of the term “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance). 
 26. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995) (“[A] ‘fun-
damental principle of . . . democracy’ . . . [is] that ‘the people should choose whom they 
please to govern them.’ . . . Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for 
congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers’ vision of a uniform National 
Legislature representing the people of the United States.” (citations omitted)). 
 27. Penalty defaults may expose one or both parties to adverse outcomes, but the 
point of the default is to induce the parties to negotiate to an efficient outcome and not to 
directly reallocate wealth.  
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party effects are absent, and issues of unconscionability do not arise.28 
It may not even be necessary to choose between procedural and sub-
stantive values in the contractual realm; voluntary contractual proce-
dures can be expected to produce substantively good (efficient) out-
comes as long as appropriate background conditions are met. 
 These moves seem unavailable in the political or constitutional 
realm. There are two main reasons for this. First, political action of-
ten has explicitly unavoidable distributional effects: indeed, the very 
reason for political action often is distributional, and in any case—as 
we have said—political actions generally interfere with others with-
out their consent. Second, there is no strong reason to think that 
normatively good procedures automatically will produce normatively 
attractive outcomes, in the way that voluntary agreements are pre-
sumed to be efficiency enhancing. As attractive as majority rule 
might be as a decision procedure, there is nothing stopping a major-
ity from taking advantage of a minority.29 
 Indeed, the core issue of political theory has to do with evaluating 
(and justifying) collective coercive (state) action, and distributionally 
motivated actions are the ones most in need of justification. For ex-
ample, Hobbes argued that the point of government was to apply co-
ercion (or the threat of it) necessary to produce social peace, which is 
the precondition for prosperity.30 The justification of the use of gov-
ernmental force lies in allowing people to live outside the brutal con-
ditions of nature. Of course, Hobbes could not ignore the distribu-
tional implications of his theory. Someone or somebody would have to 
exercise sovereign powers and that entity was authorized to make 
law whatever it deemed convenient. He accepted those consequences 
as concomitants of social peace and thought that we should rationally 
do the same.31  
 Possibly we can find the source of some constitutional defaults in 
the unadorned Hobbesian perspective. For example, the familiar pre-
sumption against judicial interference with government decisions 
found in frequent resort to “rational basis” tests might be grounded 
                                                                                                                      
 28. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 29. James Madison warned of the so called “tyranny of the majority,” which he under-
stood to mean a majority of the citizenry “who are united and actuated by some common im-
pulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent 
and aggregate interests of the community.” See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).  
 30. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 92 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (“[E]very man, ought to 
endeavour Peace, as farre [sic] as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, 
. . . he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre [sic].”); see also id. at 124 
(“[I]t belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty [sic], 
to be Judge both of the meanes [sic] of Peace and Defence.”). 
 31. See id. at 125 (“[It] is annexed to the Soveraigntie [sic], the whole power of pre-
scribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy, and what Ac-
tions he may doe [sic], without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects.”).  
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in the idea that courts should not lightly interfere with core govern-
ing capacities.32 This notion probably finds its starkest expression in 
the reluctance of courts to interfere with military operations, espe-
cially on the battlefield (or near it) and during wartime.33  
 But for the most part, we are reluctant to endorse Hobbes’s nearly 
blank check concept of authorization. Except for extreme cases we 
care about how the government takes its actions and insist that gov-
ernment action conform with various procedural and formal condi-
tions. For example, we want our government to work by means of 
general laws, announced in advance, rather than secret or informal 
orders.34 Moreover, we insist on regulated processes of lawmaking 
and have rules about law application and adjudication. These ideas 
arise not only from bare notions of legality but also from a republican 
heritage that insists on a separation of powers which requires that 
rulemaking be institutionally separated from rule enforcement and 
adjudication. It appears various default rules can be grounded in 
these principles, such as the presumptions that lawmaking be ac-
complished prospectively and that statutorily enacted administrative 
schemes are not intended to displace judicial review.35  
 We also hold deeper proto-republican values that insist that gov-
ernment’s authority is drawn from the people though frequent elec-
tions. This encourages us not only to say that the legislature should 
be the chief source of general rules but also to insist that legislatures 
are chosen in fair, open, and regular elections.36 This republican tra-
dition gives reasons for courts to insist that general rules originate in 
                                                                                                                      
 32. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955) (holding 
that state legislatures are due deference in regulating business so long as their decisions 
are rational). 
 33. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942) (“An important incident to the con-
duct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and de-
feat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in 
their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.”). 
 34. This is a complex idea that spans the notion of rule by law (a preference for gen-
eral laws rather than specific decrees) and rule of law (resistance to informal or arbitrary 
forms of rule).  
 35. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975) (stating that the absence of judi-
cial review would raise “a serious constitutional question of the validity of . . . [a] statute as 
so construed”); see also Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 
(1986) (construing a statute to provide judicial review of executive agency action to avoid 
the “ ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if . . . [the statute were] to deny a 
judicial forum for constitutional claims arising” thereunder).  
 36. In a broader democratic tradition, the notion that an elected legislature should be 
the source of rules is controversial. The Athenians (and indeed many ancient peoples) in-
sisted that the power to establish general legal principles was retained by popular assem-
blies which could not be delegated. See JOSIAH OBER, MASS AND ELITE IN DEMOCRATIC 
ATHENS: RHETORIC, IDEOLOGY, AND THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE 7-8 (1989) (“The key deci-
sion-making body of the Athenian state was the Assembly. Open to all citizens [i.e., men 
born in Athens], the Assembly met frequently (forty times per year in the later fourth cen-
tury) to debate and to decide state policy.”).  
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the legislature rather than in executive agencies, unless this power 
has been delegated in an appropriate way.37 Of course, there are 
countervailing considerations of efficiency that, in practice, have led 
courts to a relatively generous delegation principle. Still, judicial 
suspicion against excessive delegations of rulemaking authority does 
lead courts to force agencies to utilize rulemaking processes that may 
serve as functional equivalents of or substitutes for actual legislative 
deliberation.38  
 We also take note of democratic norms that go beyond the republi-
can ideas that legitimate power arises from the people as expressed 
through regular and fair elections, to notions of deliberation. The idea 
that policy ought to be grounded in reason, perhaps in public reason, 
may also ground certain constitutional defaults.39 Such defaults would 
go beyond the notions of notice or publicity that we identified in the 
republican tradition and might require that Congress deliberate ex-
plicitly in certain ways in order for its policies to have full force.40 
“Clear statement” rules that say that Congress will be understood to 
have taken certain actions only if it makes such actions explicit and 
unambiguous might best be understood in these terms.41 
 Still further, there obviously is a commitment to a set of funda-
mental rights that curtail governmental authority even when sanc-
tioned by rules established by the people’s representatives in the 
regular manner. Definitions of these rights vary widely and are 
deeply contested in their own right, but at a minimum they seem to 
                                                                                                                      
 37. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996): 
It does not suffice to say that Congress announced its will to delegate certain au-
thority. Congress as a general rule must also “lay down by legislative act an intel-
ligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to con-
form.” The intelligible-principle rule seeks to enforce the understanding that 
Congress may not delegate the power to make laws and so may delegate no more 
than the authority to make policies and rules that implement its statutes. 
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 38. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986) 
(stating that the notice and comment requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act al-
lows agencies the opportunity to consider multiple variations of a rule before deciding 
which it deems most sound).  
 39. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1689, 1689-90 (1984) (“The equal protection clause allows a state to distinguish be-
tween one person and another only if there is a plausible connection between the distinc-
tion and a legitimate public purpose.”). 
 40. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 235-51 (1976) 
(suggesting that due process in lawmaking focuses not only on what law was made, but es-
tablishes minimum procedures legislators must follow in the course of lawmaking thereby 
forcing deliberation). 
 41. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (“ ‘In traditionally sensitive 
areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement 
assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical 
matters involved in the judicial decision.’ ” (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 
349 (1971))). 
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include three general considerations: rights essential to minimally ef-
fective political participation, basic equality, and the core guarantees 
explicitly set out in the Bill of Rights.42 Whatever one thinks of at-
tendant judicial interpretations of these rights, the default presump-
tion of judicial protection found in footnote four of Carolene Prod-
ucts43 has found wide acceptance. Similarly apt is heightened scru-
tiny for government actions that curtail speech or individual liberty, 
making noninterference the default position.44 This is the very struc-
ture of heightened scrutiny review. 
 Of course, it goes virtually without saying that this complex of 
values permits grave disagreement in individual cases. Not only is 
each value subject to differing definition, but the values cannot help 
but to collide. Most familiar is the tension between majority rule and 
rights protection. But disagreements over narrower principles also 
are pervasive, such as between the right to speak and the right to be 
free from being subjected to certain forms of speech.45 
C.   The Structure of Constitutional Default Rules 
 These normative ideas allow us to characterize the typical struc-
ture of constitutional default rules. The key idea is that either the 
constitutional text or judicial determination fixes the content of de-
fault rules against which government officials take action. These ac-
tions can take legislative or administrative form and may, at times, 
represent a departure from a constitutional default. Such departures 
will normally attract court challenges which may result in change in 
the original rule. But courts may, and often do, find ways to avoid 
hearing such challenges or, if they do not refuse to do so, defer to the 
agency or to Congress. Either course of judicial action or inaction will 
not upset prior doctrine but will amount to judicial assent to gov-
ernmental practice. 
 This characterization implies that the standard way of contracting 
around a constitutional rule involves one or more political actors 
                                                                                                                      
 42. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
173-79 (1980). In describing “process rights,” Ely focuses on these very factors: effective po-
litical participation, equality, and the various rights codified in the Bill of Rights. 
 43. United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (stating that spe-
cial scrutiny is in order when dealing with certain religious, national, or racial minorities).  
 44. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution de-
mands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid, and that the Gov-
ernment bear the burden of showing their constitutionality.” (citations omitted)).  
 45. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003) (While the First Amendment 
“affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech,” it does 
permit “restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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coming to a kind of implicit agreement with courts. Given that the 
governmental actors represent only a majority, the fact of third-party 
effects requires that courts be seen as constitutional actors in this 
sense. Their duty to protect minority rights implies that they have an 
unavoidable role to play in ratifying or agreeing to any attempt to “go 
around” a constitutional rule. 
III.   THE INEVITABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES:              
A TYPOLOGY 
 The complications of default rule thinking in constitutional law are 
so great that one might wonder whether the effort is worth the candle. 
This Part establishes the nonoptional nature of constitutional default 
thinking. When fashioning rules of constitutional law, judges have a 
range of choices, from those that are relatively mandatory to those 
that permit government actors to suggest or implement alternatives. 
Take, for example, the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that no person 
“shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.”46 A court could implement this by banning all interrogation, ban-
ning coercive interrogation, banning interrogation without reading 
Miranda warnings,47 and so on. Each step along this analytic range 
adopts or rejects some form of default. This sort of choice pervades 
constitutional law, and thus is made tacitly, if not explicitly. We argue 
here and in the next Part that explicit attention to the question might 
improve the quality of constitutional decisionmaking. 
 What follows is a typology of constitutional decisions that loosely 
tracks the development of default rule thinking in contract theory. 
Although the normative considerations that inform these rules differ, 
at least at the level of description, there is more similarity than one 
would imagine. Applying the contracts categories makes clear that 
constitutional law is shot through with default rules. This regime is 
so prevalent that it calls into question the acuity of much of the 
rhetoric surrounding Supreme Court constitutional decisionmaking. 
Many constitutional rulings can be circumvented in ways other than 
constitutional amendment or judicial overruling. 
A.   Substantive Constitutional Rules and Mandatory Contract Rules 
 At first blush, the default rule literature appears to fit awkwardly 
alongside prevailing understandings of what a court does when it de-
cides a case on constitutional grounds. In common interpretation, 
constitutional decisions are binding and only can be changed by judi-
                                                                                                                      
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 47. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (“[I]f a person in custody is to 
be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms 
that he has the right to remain silent.”).  
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cial overruling or constitutional amendment. This is what people 
mean when they talk about the Supreme Court’s role as “ultimate 
arbiter” of the Constitution and what they have in mind when they 
complain about judicial supremacy.48 They mean to say that getting 
around a Supreme Court constitutional decision is tough, which is 
what calls into question in the minds of some the democratic legiti-
macy of judicial rulemaking. 
 Some constitutional rules do meet the description of the stereo-
typical binding Supreme Court precedent. Sometimes, and perhaps 
frequently, when the Supreme Court says the Constitution means X, 
that is the meaning that governs absent amendment or overruling, 
and officials who violate X do so at their peril. The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the Fourth Amendment generally to require police 
officers to have a warrant before searching people’s homes.49 The offi-
cer who conducts an unwarranted search of a home faces the risk of 
monetary liability.50 Sometimes, a rule is a rule. 
 Of course, there are relatively obdurate contract rules as well, in 
the sense that the parties to a contract cannot avoid them, though 
the rules can be changed by legislative decision. These commonly are 
referred to as immutable, or mandatory rules.51 For example, under 
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) the duty to act in good faith 
is an immutable part of any contract.52  
 The difference between mandatory contract rules and substantive 
constitutional rules lies in the parties entitled to change them. Man-
datory contract rules can only be changed by those empowered to es-
                                                                                                                      
 48. See  Kramer, supra note 9, at 15: 
[T]he historical development of judicial review [is] hugely ironic. We have 
moved from a world in which the interpretive authority of the political 
branches was clear and that of the Supreme Court questionable and uncertain, 
to one in which the Court’s authority stands unchallenged while that of every-
one else is under siege. 
Id. 
 49. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981) (“In terms that apply 
equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has 
drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that thresh-
old may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 590 (1980))). 
 50. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 395 (1971) (“That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition. 
Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of per-
sonal interests in liberty.”).  
 51. As pointed out by Adam Hirsch, “immutable” and “mandatory” are used inter-
changeably. See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of 
Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1032 n.1 (2004) (citing Russell Korobkin, The En-
dowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1269 (2003)).  
 52. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); see 
also Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1983); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 81 (3d ed. 1986). 
840  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:825 
 
tablish such rules: usually judges or the legislature. In the constitu-
tional realm, substantive (mandatory) rules will generally be 
changeable only by a constitutional actor—perhaps an Article V ma-
jority or a judge. 
 We hesitate to call substantive constitutional rules mandatory be-
cause even with regard to relatively rigid rules, constitutional actors 
sometimes can achieve something close to their ends by changing the 
facts. The police officer who searches a home without a warrant can 
claim there were exigent circumstances requiring this action. If the 
claim is fair, the search will be upheld.53 
 Of course, such contracting around can lead to yet another judicial 
decision that, as a substantive matter, bars the later version of the 
practice. Recently, for example, the Supreme Court limited the abil-
ity of police to contract around the Miranda rule by interrogating de-
tainees prior to reading them the required warnings, then starting 
afresh.54 This point requires underscoring: in our system courts re-
tain the authority (subject to the Article V procedure) to impose a 
substantive rule and limit contracting around. But frequently judi-
cial decisions approve of fact differences as having constitutional sig-
nificance, and thus sanction officials contracting around the initial 
rules. 
B.   Majoritarian Default Rules 
 In contract, the early position on default rules was that courts 
ought to adopt a rule that a majority of contracting parties would fa-
vor.55 Because contracting around judicial rules involved transaction 
                                                                                                                      
 53. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (“We agree with the Court of Ap-
peals that neither the entry without warrant to search for the robber, nor the search for 
him without warrant was invalid. Under the circumstances of this case, ‘the exigencies of 
the situation made that course imperative.’ ” (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 
451, 456 (1948))). 
 54. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004) (“Because the question-first tac-
tic effectively threatens to thwart Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced 
confession would be admitted, . . . postwarning statements are inadmissible.”). 
 55. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 
91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982) (stating that default fiduciary duties are derived from a hypo-
thetical contract, imagined by judges, between investors and managers dickering with each 
other free of bargaining costs); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1433 (1989) (asserting that a default term should be 
“the term that the parties would have selected with full information and costless contract-
ing”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1182 (1981) (suggesting that 
corporate law supply “standard form ‘contracts’ of the sort shareholders would be likely to 
choose”). Calabresi and Melamed’s analysis may be an early antecedent of the majoritarian 
rule. They argued that efficiency-minded law would establish default entitlements as the 
parties would allocate them in a world without transaction costs. Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Ca-
thedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093-98 (1972). 
2006]                       CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES 841 
 
costs, efficiency concerns suggested courts often should adopt a rule 
that most parties would have adopted if left to their own devices. 
Later literature questioned whether this was always the case, lead-
ing to the panoply of default rule possibilities we recognize today.56 
But at the outset, efficiency concerns seemed logically to require ma-
joritarian defaults, and still that is true in many instances. Take 
commercial law, for example. The U.C.C. puts courts squarely in the 
role of interpreting contracts in terms of the hypothetical majori-
tarian bargain by requiring that gaps or ambiguities be interpreted 
in accord with common (or majoritarian) commercial practice.57 
 In constitutional law, the idea of majoritarian constitutional rules 
may seem counterintuitive. Since the New Deal, individual rights 
protection has been a strong strain of constitutional law.58 Even to-
day’s conservative Supreme Court recognizes its important role in 
protecting minority rights.59 In many areas of constitutional law, 
such as equal protection or the protection of individual liberty, one 
would not expect to find majority preferences the default.  
 Nonetheless, in deciding constitutional cases, the Supreme Court 
often mandates a majoritarian default. Constitutional majoritarian de-
fault rules can take on two distinct forms. The most common, and least 
interesting, is the general tendency of courts to adopt legal tests that 
defer to governmental preferences, outside a defined set of excep-
tions.60 This is accomplished through the structure of the doctrine it-
self. For example, the rational basis test, pervasive in some form in 
constitutional law, demands deference to previous government deci-
sions.61 Of course, the government officials to whom a court defers may 
not themselves be representative of the relevant majority, a problem 
we discuss below with regard to the appropriate application of the de-
                                                                                                                      
 56. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 390-92 (presenting a typology of default rules: 
problem-solving defaults, equilibrium-inducing defaults, information-forcing defaults, 
normative defaults, transformative defaults, and structural defaults).  
 57. U.C.C. § 2-208 (2005).  
 58. The basic terms of the New Deal settlement included “ ‘a more exacting judicial 
inquiry’ to protect a broad category of individual rights, including those specified in or in-
ferred from the Bill of Rights and Reconstruction Amendments; those pertaining to voting 
and the political process; and those necessary to protect racial, religious, or other ‘discrete 
and insular minorities.’ ” Kramer, supra note 9, at 122 (quoting United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).  
 59. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005) (holding that 
“retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is a 
form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title IX’s private cause of action”); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding law school’s affirmative action plan); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas antisodomy law); Shaw v. 
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (striking down a state’s attempt at racial gerrymandering).  
 60. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 43, 56-74 (1989) (discussing the Court’s tendency to defer to majority decisionmakers 
(i.e., government) unless governmental preferences discriminate against an insular and 
discrete minority). 
 61. See cases cited supra note 32.  
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fault rules literature in the constitutional arena.62 But the thrust of 
judicial deference is to allow democratic majorities to govern.63  
 The more interesting majoritarian defaults are substantive rules 
of constitutional law fashioned deliberately to reflect majority senti-
ment. The ancient understanding of due process as “the law of the 
land”64 reflects this, as do more modern formulations such as “evolv-
ing standards of decency”65 and the “emerging awareness” of soci-
ety.66 Even rights-protective aspects of constitutional text sometimes 
are construed as majoritarian in nature, such as the Eighth Amend-
ment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, 67 or the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement that government searches and seizures 
must be “reasonable.”68 
 Recalling the discussion in Part II, to say that a test is majori-
tarian in the constitutional context still begs the question of which 
majority. Contest in political theory regarding the division of author-
ity is amply reflected in judicial decisions. The Supreme Court often 
adopts an intriguing tradeoff between federalist and nationalist val-
ues, looking for consensus among the states as entities. For example, 
when it comes to the propriety of execution—for particular crimes or 
for youthful or mentally infirm suspects—the court often polls the 
                                                                                                                      
 62. See infra Part IV. 
 63. See Chemerinsky, supra note 60, at 61 (attributing the Court’s deferential ap-
proach to constitutional decisionmaking to a “dominant paradigm of constitutional law and 
scholarship, a paradigm that emphasizes the democratic roots of the American polity and 
that characterizes judicial review as at odds with American democracy”).  
 64. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support 
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1309 (2005) (“The Due 
Process Clause requires that the government act according to the ‘law of the land,’ that is, 
through generalized rules serving the public interest.” (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 580-82 (1819) (argument of Daniel Webster))).  
 65. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion)) (suggesting “cruel and unusual” is an evolving standard). 
 66. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). In Lawrence, the Court based its de-
cision to invalidate the Texas sodomy law, and thereby overrule Bowers, on the “emerging 
awareness” of society, both in America and abroad. Id. Specifically, the Court held, “[t]hese 
references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” Id.  
 67. The Court’s jurisprudence on capital punishment of minors might be the most bla-
tant adherence to majoritarian sentiment, resting its decisions on “contemporary” or 
“evolving” standards of decency. Compare Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-68 (finding sufficient con-
sensus among the states that the subjection of minors to the death penalty is “cruel and 
unusual” and thus unconstitutional), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 
(1989) (indicating insufficient national consensus “to label a particular punishment cruel 
and unusual”).  
 68. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (People are “to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”); see also Illinois v. MacArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 
(2001) (declaring that the Fourth Amendment’s “central requirement” is one of reason-
ableness). 
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states to measure prevailing practice and generally accedes to it.69 At 
the least, the Court requires that a substantial number of states 
have abandoned a practice before the Court condemns it. This prac-
tice of polling the states is apparent in some of the more contentious 
decisions in recent years. In the pair of gay rights decisions Bowers v. 
Hardwick70 and Lawrence v. Texas,71 for example, the trend of public 
opinion played a large role.72 The same was true when the Supreme 
Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.73 
 At other times, however, the Court’s view of a national majority 
overrides state preferences, whether measured individually or collec-
tively. Thus, in California v. Greenwood,74 the defendant argued that 
the unwarranted seizure of his trash violated the Fourth Amend-
ment’s reasonableness requirement because, inter alia, there were 
laws against picking through someone’s trash and the California Su-
preme Court had held trash protected from scrutiny by the California 
                                                                                                                      
 69. First pointed out by Steve Winter, this practice is prevalent in the Court’s juris-
prudence. See Steven L. Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practice of Judi-
cial Review, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 679 (1986); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 
(“[Thirty] states prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising [twelve] that have rejected 
the death penalty altogether and [eighteen] that maintain it but, by express provision or 
judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
315-16 (2002) (“[T]he large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally re-
tarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the 
power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views 
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”); 
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71 (noting that twenty-two of the thirty-seven death penalty 
states permitted the death penalty for sixteen-year-old offenders, and, among these thirty-
seven states, twenty-five permitted it for seventeen-year-old offenders. These numbers, in 
the Court’s view, indicated there was no national consensus “sufficient to label a particular 
punishment cruel and unusual.”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (stressing 
only two states had enacted laws banning the imposition of the death penalty on a men-
tally retarded person convicted of a capital offense. According to the Court, “the two state 
statutes prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the 14 States 
that have rejected capital punishment completely, [did] not provide sufficient evidence at 
present of a national consensus.”).  
 70. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
 71. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 72. See id. at 572-73. The Court meticulously documented reactions to Bowers v. 
Hardwick among the states. It found that “25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant 
conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their 
laws only against homosexual conduct.” Id. at 573. The Court continued, “[i]n those States 
where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a 
pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private.” Id. The 
Court concluded, “[t]hese references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives sub-
stantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in mat-
ters pertaining to sex.” Id. at 572. 
 73. 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961). The Court again rested its decision on majoritarian 
practice. It noted that prior to Wolf, nearly “two-thirds of the States were opposed to the 
use of the exclusionary rule.” Id. (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)). Now, despite 
Wolf, “more than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial de-
cision, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule.” Id. 
 74. 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
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Constitution.75 The Supreme Court peremptorily dismissed the no-
tion that a state’s law might govern the national concept of reason-
ableness: “We have already concluded that society possesses no such 
understanding with regard to garbage left for collection at the side of 
a public street.”76 In other search cases the Court has held police 
conduct reasonable despite state trespass laws.77  
 On some questions the Court will defer to a state or even a sub-
state actor as representing the relevant majoritarian decisionmaker. 
The Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence can be 
understood in this way. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has 
held that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity, ex-
cept in limited areas.78 However, nothing precludes states from abro-
gating their own immunity, making themselves liable for violations 
of state or federal law.79 Rather than immunizing states, then, what 
the Supreme Court’s decisions do is relegate to state decisionmakers 
the power to determine the level of state immunity, and thus consti-
tutional protection. Similarly, in assessing what speech is “obscene” 
and thus outside First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court’s 
test explicitly takes into account the values of local majorities.80 
 Particularly contentious at the moment is jurisprudence suggest-
ing that the relevant majority on some issues includes international 
consensus.81 In issues as divisive as gay rights and the death penalty, 
                                                                                                                      
 75. Id. (citing People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971)). 
 76. Id. at 43-44. 
 77. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding that police officers who 
trespassed upon posted and fenced private land did not violate the Fourth Amendment, de-
spite the fact that their action was subject to criminal sanctions); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (making plain that the question whether the disputed evidence had 
been procured by means of a trespass was irrelevant); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 466-69 (1928) (deeming the illegality under state law of a wiretap that yielded the 
disputed evidence irrelevant to its admissibility); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 
(1924) (trespass in “open fields” does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 78. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 683 (1999) (“Recognizing a congressional power to exact constructive waivers of sover-
eign immunity through the exercise of Article I powers would also, as a practical matter, 
permit Congress to circumvent the antiabrogation holding of Seminole Tribe.”); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (“[T]he powers delegated to Congress under Article I of the 
United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to 
private suits for damages in state courts.”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the states’ sov-
ereign immunity “[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking au-
thority over a particular area”).  
 79. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (“Many States, on their own initiative, have enacted stat-
utes consenting to a wide variety of suits. The rigors of sovereign immunity are thus ‘miti-
gated by a sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the 
sovereign.’ ” (quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944))). 
 80. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957) (supporting jury instruc-
tion that obscenity is to be judged based on its perception of community consensus). 
 81. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (citing Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (acknowledging international views regarding a minimum 
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the Justices have sparred over whether it is appropriate, or even 
sensible, to conceive the United States Constitution as taking ac-
count of international opinion. While Justice Kennedy believes it 
“proper” to “acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international 
opinion,”82 Justice Scalia contends that “the basic premise of the 
Court’s argument—that American law should comport to the laws of 
the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”83 
 The salient point about all these tests is that based as they are on 
majority sentiment, the relevant majority easily has it in its control 
to change the pertinent constitutional rule—at least outside the in-
ternational norms context. Thus it was that in the years between 
Bowers and Lawrence, twelve states got rid of their proscriptions on 
homosexual sodomy,84 and in the years between Wolf and Mapp, 
roughly seventeen states moved to some version of the exclusionary 
rule.85 States may seem to be, or even believe they are, simply chang-
ing the rule within the state, but in a sense they are voting on the 
national norm as well. 
C.   Penalty Defaults: Forcing Information and Deliberation 
 It was not long before contracts scholars realized that the transac-
tion costs of contracting around could be brought into the service of 
better (meaning typically, although not exclusively, more efficient) 
outcomes. If, for example, contracting parties were operating in an 
environment of asymmetric information and if forced revelation of 
the information would lead to a more efficient outcome, then perhaps 
a court should adopt a default rule that served precisely to require 
the release of information. The classic example here (although dis-
agreement rapidly developed as to how is should play out) is Hadley 
                                                                                                                      
age for the death penalty)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (surveying inter-
national consensus regarding gay rights and sodomy); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 
(2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (surveying international perspective with regard to affirma-
tive action); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing international law and 
consensus as to the death penalty for the mentally retarded); see also Stephen G. Calabresi, 
Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign Consti-
tutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1106 (2004) (“[F]oreign 
court decisions are relevant to policy making, but not to [constitutional] interpretation.”); Lori 
Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: The United States Constitution and Interna-
tional Law—Editor’s Introduction, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 42 (2004) (suggesting that current 
opinions represent “a long-term trend toward a more cosmopolitan jurisprudence”); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human 
Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1999) (arguing the relevance of international law 
to constitutional interpretation concerning affirmative action). 
 82. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 83. Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 84. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (“The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant 
conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their 
laws only against homosexual conduct.”).  
 85. See discussion supra note 73.  
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v. Baxendale, which holds that a contracting party cannot be held li-
able for unusual consequential damages of which it was not made 
aware.86 At least in one interpretation, the rule of Hadley will force 
the party facing unforeseeable consequential damages to reveal those 
circumstances, permitting the contracting party to make an efficient 
decision regarding whether to contract and on what terms.87 Another 
example comes from the common law, the maxim that documents 
will be construed against the drafter.88 Many of the prominent exam-
ples of penalty default rules in the contractual area serve the pur-
pose of information-forcing in the service of efficiency. There is, at 
the moment, a certain degree of skepticism about such rules in the 
contracts area,89 though unquestionably the center of the literature 
recognizes such rules and they plainly exist in some instances, even 
if those instances are limited.90  
 Penalty defaults can be found in constitutional law decisions as 
well, though—as we explored above—they play by different rules, and 
there is a broader range of normative goals. To be sure, one purpose of 
constitutional defaults can be information-forcing, just as in the con-
tractual area. Consider in this regard the common form of judgment in 
a habeas corpus case. If the prisoner succeeds, the executive is ordered 
to release the prisoner by a fixed date, absent another trial being held. 
The penalty—release of the prisoner—is sufficiently harsh that the 
executive is forced to reveal any information it has justifying deten-
tion. If the executive lacks adequate evidence of guilt, then detention 
is inappropriate.91 Similarly, the probable cause requirement of the 
                                                                                                                      
 86. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.). 
 87. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1 (introducing the idea of “penalty defaults” 
and suggesting that such defaults provide incentive to contract around this default, 
thereby resulting in the production of information); William Bishop, The Contract-Tort 
Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241 (1983) (suggesting that 
the Hadley rule could promote efficient revelation of information); Charles J. Goetz & 
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 
1261 (1980) (positing that the limitation on damages for unforeseeable consequences of 
breach can increase efficiency by stimulating the provision of information between bar-
gainers). But see Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 1547, 1547 (1999) (suggesting that the “structure of penalty-default theory as de-
rived from Hadley rests on a faulty implicit premise . . . that damages from breach of con-
tract are certain . . . [and thus] overlooks the potential incentive of a party to conceal in-
formation even though the party is subject to a penalty-default rule”). 
 88. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 391 n.3 (“Information-forcing defaults originated in 
the common law maxim that a document will be construed against the drafter. The default 
rule is supposed to create a stronger incentive for disclosure than the common law rule.”). 
 89. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.  
 90. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1 (suggesting that contract rules are either im-
mutable rules or default rules); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 390-92 (producing an introduc-
tory list of contractual default rules). See generally Symposium on Default Rules and Con-
tractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993).  
 91. See, e.g., RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE 667-70 (4th ed., Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 2001) (nothing that a 
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Fourth Amendment generally is designed to force revelation of gov-
ernment reasons that justify the invasion of personal privacy. Also 
pertinent is the Brady rule, which penalizes the government for failing 
to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant.92 
 The information-forcing possibility of rules like this in constitu-
tional law is demonstrated by the differing approaches of the Justices 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.93 Hamdi involved the question whether the 
government could hold indefinitely and for purposes of interrogation 
a U.S. citizen captured on or near the battlefield, without affording 
any process to determine if such detention was warranted. By an 8-1 
majority, the Court effectively reversed the United States’ position 
that such indefinite detention was warranted, but the different opin-
ions implied very different consequences.94 
 Justice O’Connor’s plurality decision in Hamdi effectively adopted 
a substantive constitutional rule, of the sort identified in Part III.A, 
above. Her opinion took the position that such detention was inap-
propriate absent an authorizing act of Congress. She found the Au-
thorization of the Use of Military Force Act (AUMF) adopted after 
the September 11, 2001, attacks to be sufficient.95 Nonetheless, she 
held that detention was impermissible without certain procedural 
safeguards such as notice and counsel. 96 She thus remanded the case 
in light of that rule requiring the government to provide the proce-
dures (or release the detainee). Justice O’Connor’s rule is one that 
the relevant parties (here Congress and/or the Executive branch) can 
contract around. 
 In contrast with the substantive rule-like form of the O’Connor 
plurality, the separate opinions of Justice Souter (joined by Justice 
Ginsburg) and Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Stevens) are more in 
the nature of penalty defaults. Justice Souter did not believe the 
AUMF provided the necessary authorization for detention. He simply 
would have ordered release of the detainee absent “a further Act of 
Congress, criminal charges, a showing that the detention conforms to 
the laws of war, or a demonstration that [a federal statute barring 
                                                                                                                      
summary judgment motion, and thus release, may be granted if the answer fails to bring 
facts into dispute—i.e., if the executive fails to assert facts which implicate petitioner’s guilt).  
 92. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[S]uppression by the prosecution 
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”).  
 93. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 516-19.  
 96. Id. at 536. (“[W]hile the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions 
in other settings may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant set-
ting, the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are 
not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Govern-
ment’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.”). 
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detention of U.S. citizens was] unconstitutional.”97 Justice Scalia 
would have gone further and held that no such detention was per-
missible absent criminal charges or suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus by Congress, something justified only when the public safety 
requires it in times of rebellion or invasion.98 
 The separate opinions of Justices Souter and Scalia in Hamdi 
demonstrate the information-forcing functions of default rules in 
constitutional law. In effect, Justices Scalia and Souter were seeking 
two sorts of information, and they were prepared to adopt a rule that 
would produce it. Either they wanted the government to come for-
ward with evidence that Hamdi was guilty of a crime, one the gov-
ernment felt it successfully could prosecute in criminal court, or they 
wanted the Congress to provide clear evidence that it supported the 
indefinite detention of American citizens and under what conditions.  
 This example also demonstrates that in constitutional law, pen-
alty default rules also can be deliberation-forcing.99 In addition to 
mandating that the government divulge information, the separate 
opinions of Justices Scalia and Souter would have required congres-
sional deliberation regarding the propriety of indefinite detention of 
American citizens under wartime conditions. As Hamdi demon-
strates, that deliberation could be required within the Executive 
Branch or more broadly within the Congress and the country itself. 
 This same approach might have been used in Rasul v. Bush, in-
volving the detention of supposed enemy aliens at the naval base at 
Guantanamo Bay100—“supposed” because the United States has re-
fused to afford process to the detainees, some of whom dispute their 
characterization as enemy aliens. The majority of the Court adopted 
a minimalist approach to the case, holding only that the District 
Court had jurisdiction to hear the claims and saying nothing about 
                                                                                                                      
 97. Id. at 553 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated: 
If the situation demands it, the Executive can ask Congress to authorize sus-
pension of the writ—which can be made subject to whatever conditions Con-
gress deems appropriate, including even the procedural novelties invented by 
the plurality today. To be sure, suspension is limited by the Constitution to 
cases of rebellion or invasion. But whether the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
constitute an “invasion,” and whether those attacks still justify suspension sev-
eral years later, are questions for Congress rather than this Court. 
Id. 
 99. The same can be true in the area of statutory interpretation. Einer Elhauge refers 
to such penalty defaults as “preference-eliciting.” Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra 
note 6. Elhauge would constrain the use of such rules to situations where politically influ-
ential groups are likely to be able to move the political process on the issue if legislative 
preferences are in accord. See, e.g., id. at 2105. We advance a similar argument norma-
tively. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
 100. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
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what process was required.101 This disposition has led to much ban-
tering and confusion in the lower courts, something the Supreme 
Court ultimately may have to step up and resolve.102  
 The Court might, however, have gone a bit further and used a 
penalty default rule to resolve the matter more efficaciously, and also 
perhaps consistent with democratic norms. Hints of one approach are 
seen in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion. Although he purports 
to be narrowing the majority’s holding that habeas always lies to 
hear claims of inappropriate detention so long as the detainee’s war-
den is within the jurisdiction of an Article III court, in effect he de-
mands more than the majority by stating that he would disapprove 
detention when it is indefinite and without procedures adequate to 
determine the status of the detainees.103 Under Justice Kennedy’s 
approach, release follows absent development of the necessary proce-
dures and their implementation, an information-forcing function. 
 A more dramatic course might have been to adopt the Souter or 
Scalia approach of Hamdi and, having found that habeas lies, or-
dered the release of the prisoners absent clear congressional authori-
zation and a legislatively established set of circumstances and proce-
dures for holding them. Such a decision would have forced delibera-
tion in the U.S. Congress (and undoubtedly among the American 
                                                                                                                      
 101. The Court concluded that section 2241 “confers on the District Court jurisdiction 
to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the Guan-
tanamo Bay Naval Base.” Id. at 484. As to the requisite process, however, the Court simply 
stated that such are “matters that we need not address now.” Id. at 485.  
 102. See, e.g., Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that Presi-
dent’s war powers and Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force authorized 
President to issue order for capture and detention of combatants); In re Guantanamo De-
tainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that detainees had the funda-
mental Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law). 
The Supreme Court may shed some light on this question when it hands down its opinion 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005). 
However, the Court first must determine that intervening congressional legislation did not 
disturb its jurisdiction. 
 103. Justice Kennedy would have adopted the approach taken in Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). See, e.g., Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Eisentrager considered a number of factors in finding the jurisdiction proper. First, the 
Court considered the “ascending scale of rights” afforded individuals depending on their 
connection with the United States. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770. Such rights are height-
ened when the detainee is a citizen of or physically present in the United States. Id. Next, 
the Court looked to whether the detainees were actual enemies of the United States. Id. at 
778. Finally, the Court considered the extent to which judicial intervention would interfere 
with war efforts and thus executive control. Id. at 779. From Eisentrager, Kennedy con-
cluded that there is “a realm of political authority over military affairs where the judicial 
power may not enter.” Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But “as the period 
of detention stretches from months to years, the case for continued detention to meet mili-
tary exigencies becomes weaker.” Id. at 488. By adopting this approach, Justice Kennedy 
sought to avoid automatic statutory authority to adjudicate claims, but left the door open 
to such authority by resting on military exigency. The longer a detainee is held, the less 
exigent the situation becomes and the more justified the court is in intervening. 
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people) as to the appropriate treatment of the Guantanamo detain-
ees. It is worth observing that this would not necessarily require 
Congress itself to resolve all aspects of the problem: Congress could, 
after debate, have determined to delegate the matter to the Execu-
tive with greater or lesser discretion. Then, however, Executive au-
thority would have been warranted.104 
 Default rules such as these are not meant to displace the possibil-
ity of substantive rulemaking. Suppose, in the Hamdi case, that the 
Court had adopted Justice Souter’s position and Congress had passed 
a statute authorizing detention indefinitely and without any process. 
Surely the Court would remain free when the next case arose to state 
that such a statute itself failed to pass constitutional muster, per-
haps under the due process clause.  
D.   Normative, Transformative, and Model Defaults 
 The next category of default rules is a bit of a hodgepodge, but the 
basic thrust is that they are adopted in the hopes of changing the law 
in normatively desirable ways.105 Judges may have opinions as to 
what sorts of terms or practices are best, and can use their decisions 
to cajole, persuade or encourage that sort of contracting. Rather than 
adopting a majoritarian default, for example, a judge can simply pick 
the rule that seems normatively attractive and hope that contracting 
parties see the wisdom and follow it. In the contract area the only 
real difference between this approach and a majoritarian default is 
whether the court believes it can lead a majority of contracting par-
ties to a place it might otherwise not be. Of course, if rules are 
sticky—if they involve serious transaction costs to contract around—
then a judicial proposal might adhere for reasons other than norma-
tive desirability, derogating from efficiency. 
 Although these normative or transformative default rules receive 
less attention in the contracting literature, they play a potentially 
                                                                                                                      
 104. In fact, Justice Thomas made this point in dissent of Hamdi. See Hamdi v. Rums-
feld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that the 
Constitution places in the President the “authority to protect the national security and 
that this authority carries with it broad discretion.” Id. at 581; see also U.S. CONST. art. II. 
Alternatively, Justice Thomas suggested that where, as here, 
[T]he President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Con-
gress, he exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by Congress[, and 
i]n such a case the executive action “would be supported by the strongest of pre-
sumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of 
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.” 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584 (citations omitted).  
 105. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legisla-
tures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (analyzing the American Law Institute’s practice of 
suggesting normatively desirable rules for courts to apply); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 391 
(“[A] normative default rule directs a result that the decision maker prefers on fairness 
grounds but is unwilling to require.”). 
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large role in constitutional law. Whether they should or should not is 
complicated by the difficulty of contracting around the default rule, 
as we explain at some length below. For now, it is enough to observe 
how common it is for constitutional decisions to impose rules believed 
to be normatively-attractive, even as they permit the parties to con-
tract around them in various ways.  
 First, some constitutional decisions serve as what we will call a 
model default, suggesting one way government can solve a constitu-
tional problem, while leaving open other alternatives. The paradigm 
here is the rule of Miranda v. Arizona.106 Miranda recognized that 
police custodial interrogation poses constitutional problems in that it 
may overbear the will of suspects.107 Yet, given the nature of custo-
dial interrogation—it commonly takes place with the suspect incom-
municado and beyond public scrutiny—it is often difficult ex post to 
determine whether the will has been overborne. Thus, Miranda held 
that if statements made to police officers while in custody in response 
to interrogation are to be admitted, suspects must be read the now 
familiar Miranda warnings.108 
 Miranda was not a substantive rule, it was a model default. The 
Miranda Court was quite clear in stating that the rule handed down 
applied in the absence of some other way of assuring voluntary con-
fessions.109 Although some governments now are experimenting with 
videotaped confessions,110 there has been no genuine effort by gov-
                                                                                                                      
 106. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
 107. See id. at 469 (“The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can oper-
ate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his inter-
rogators.”).  
 108. See id. at 444 (holding that statements obtained from defendants during incom-
municado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of consti-
tutional rights, were inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination). 
 109. See id. at 467. Specifically, the Court held:  
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the 
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of 
their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Consti-
tution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inher-
ent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our 
decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap 
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage 
Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly ef-
fective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient 
enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other proce-
dures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right 
of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following 
safeguards must be observed. 
Id. 
 110. See Robert Schwaneberg, Suspects Must Be Recorded, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), Oct. 18, 2005, at 21 (reporting that the New Jersey Supreme Court announced that 
“[p]olice will be required to . . . record interrogations from the moment a suspect has been 
informed of his rights”).  
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ernments to advance something like videotaped confessions as an al-
ternative to the Miranda procedure. This is odd given the fact that 
Miranda continues to be controversial in some quarters.111 We return 
to the Miranda example below as we discuss some of the normative 
difficulties with applying default rules in the constitutional context.  
 Another example of a model default involves remedies for constitu-
tional torts. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court held that individuals subjected 
to constitutional torts could sue the responsible government officials 
for money damages.112 In creating a constitutional money damages 
remedy, however, the Supreme Court made clear that its rule was a 
model default. The Bivens Court stated that its remedy stood absent 
Congress developing an alternative remedy that was equally effica-
cious in protecting the underlying right.113 Subsequent cases reveal a 
dialogue in which the Court and Congress have worked out the con-
tours of such alternative remedies in various areas.114 
 A second sort of normative default is exemplified by an increas-
ingly rich literature recognizing that institutional characteristics 
limit the breadth to which courts can go in stating and enforcing con-
stitutional rights. Seminal here is Lawrence Sager’s idea of constitu-
tional underenforcement.115 Sager’s point was that the Constitution 
may be understood as requiring more than courts themselves can or 
should necessarily enforce. This is how Sager explains, for example, 
the power of Congress to exceed judicial interpretations of Four-
                                                                                                                      
 111. See, e.g., Brief for Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525) (“The Miranda 
Rule of automatic suppression—as distinct from the giving of warnings in themselves—
disserves the victims of crime and frustrates the efforts of police and prosecutors to secure 
proper, probative statements from criminal suspects.”).  
 112. 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971).  
 113. See id. at 397 (“[W]e have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons 
injured by a federal officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money 
damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effec-
tive in the view of Congress.”); cf. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding that because 
the claims arose out of an employment relationship that was governed by comprehensive 
procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United 
States, it would be inappropriate for the court to supplement that regulatory scheme with 
a new nonstatutory damages remedy).  
 114. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Reme-
dies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 767-73 (1991) (describing a “dialogic theory of remediation” in 
which courts “defer[] to the interests of rights-violators in shaping remedies and then nego-
tiat[e] with those same bodies as to enforcement”). 
 115. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Con-
stitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978); see also LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN 
PLAINCLOTHES 84-92 (2004) (suggesting that the “thinness” of the Constitution is due in 
large part to judicial underenforcement—i.e., the refusal to enforce the Constitution to its 
outermost margins).  
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teenth Amendment rights through the exercise of its Section 5 en-
forcement power. 116 
 These second sorts of normative defaults might be thought of as 
constitutional bottoms. For a variety of pragmatic or conceptual rea-
sons, a court’s prescriptions might leave room for other constitutional 
actors to take a more aggressive posture toward rights enforcement. 
A familiar constitutional bottom is the understanding that the fed-
eral Constitution provides a substantive floor below which states 
may not fall but does not limit more rights-protective action under a 
state constitution.117 Thus, many state courts have ordered minimally 
adequate school funding or funding parity, whereas the federal 
courts have declined to order this remedy under the federal Constitu-
tion.118 Similarly, state courts have protected a woman’s right to 
choose abortion more aggressively than the federal courts.119 In the 
criminal procedure arena, state courts frequently provide safeguards 
under the state constitutions that are stronger than those under the 
federal Constitution.120  
E.   Structural Defaults 
 There is one final type of default rule whose application in the con-
stitutional area may make more sense than in contracting. Contracts 
scholars have identified the “structural” default, which is nothing 
more than a set of rules that tells contracting parties how to create an 
enforceable contract.121 A familiar example is the statute of frauds, 
                                                                                                                      
 116. Sager asserts there are “institutional” and “analytical” limitations to judicial en-
forcement. The institutional limitations stem in large part from the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty and judicial manageability of a particular rule. Thus, to overcome the underenforce-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress should be given greater leeway. While this 
may not address the analytical limitations, it would address the institutional limitations 
thereby remedying the problem of underenforcement. See SAGER, supra note 115, at 114-15.  
 117. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (recognizing that states 
may afford greater protection to individual rights and, when done, the states’ decisions be 
left “free and unfettered by [the Court] in interpreting their state constitutions” (citations 
omitted)). 
 118. Compare Brigham v. Vermont, 692 A.2d 384, 397 (Vt. 1997) (holding that the 
“educational financing system in Vermont violates the right to equal educational opportu-
nities under chapter II, section 68 and chapter I, article 7 of the Vermont Constitution”), 
with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of 
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. 
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).  
 119. Compare Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 
2000) (employing strict scrutiny standard of review), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (setting forth the “undue burden” standard of review).  
 120. See, e.g., State v. Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423, 430 n.6 (Tenn. 1995) (stating that 
courts are “always free to expand the minimum level of protection mandated by the federal 
constitution” (citations omitted)). 
 121. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 391 (noting that structural defaults tell “parties 
how to make their agreement legally binding”). For further analysis of structural default 
rules, see Avery Katz, Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When 
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which requires written contracts under certain circumstances. The dif-
ficult problem with the notion of structural contract defaults is that 
the category may be all encompassing. In some sense all contract rules 
are specifications on how to form a binding contract.  
 Structural constitutional rules are important. From the Constitution 
itself we have the familiar example of bicameralism and presentment as 
a means of enacting a valid law.122 Judicial decisions can also create 
structural defaults. Imagine a more robust nondelegation doctrine, in 
which certain regulations also would have to be enacted by Congress to 
have the force of law. Restrictions on the exercise by private parties of 
governmental authority also provide a structural default specifying not 
what power may be exercised, but how it must be.123 
IV.   POSITIVE THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RULES 
 Despite the variety and pervasiveness of default rules, one might 
reasonably wonder if there is any purchase to default rule thinking 
in constitutional theory. Default thinking shapes normative inquiry 
in particular ways, to be sure, but still the questions are familiar 
ones. Concerns about the normative basis of a default rule implicate 
long-standing questions regarding constitutional values, just as the 
question of which body can set a default raises the familiar debate 
about judicial review. 
 We believe that default thinking not only emphasizes the neces-
sity of answering these questions in individual cases, it also serves 
them up in ways that can provide new insights. The frame in which 
one asks a question often affects the answer one reaches. To make 
good on that hypothesis, we look in this Part at the problem of “con-
tracting around” in constitutional law. Our hope is to show that one 
common assumption of constitutional law is deeply problematic, 
while another idea that may seem nutty on first impression actually 
contains a germ of good sense. 
                                                                                                                      
Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance?, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 77 
(1993); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: 
A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621 (1993). 
 122. See INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (“Congress can implement [a law] in only 
one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President.”).  
 123. Congress may delegate power to nongovernment entities if the delegation of power 
provides for sufficient oversight of the private entity. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. 
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (finding that Congress, in delegating some price-fixing author-
ity to a private industry entity, the Bituminous Coal Code, had entrusted sufficient over-
sight and authority to a government entity, the National Bituminous Coal Commission, to 
make the delegation constitutional). 
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A.   Transaction Costs and Bargaining Models 
 Transaction costs loom large in the contractual literature on de-
fault rules.124 Absent transaction costs, the Coase Theorem suggests 
what rule a court adopts matters little, as the parties will bargain to 
the most efficient outcome. Even here there will be distributive im-
plications as different rules correspond to different distributions of 
property. But transaction costs, like gravity and friction, do exist. 
This makes the correct placement of a legal rule of some allocative as 
well as distributive importance, and also motivates the strategic use 
of default rules to solve dysfunctions of contracting such as asym-
metric information. 
 Generally speaking, the transaction costs of contracting pale in 
comparison to those in the constitutional realm. Formally, the de-
fault rule perspective is similar to that taken by sequential bargain-
ing models employed in the study of legislatures. In that approach, 
the bargain that the parties will agree to depends on what is vari-
ously called the “status quo” or reversion point.125 In political science, 
of course, attention is restricted neither to bilateral negotiations nor 
to rules requiring unanimous acceptance for agreement. Instead at-
tention has mostly been given to majority rules.126 But then there is 
no reason for the default rule approach to be restricted in those ways 
either. From a descriptive standpoint, what the approaches have in 
common is the centrality of sequence in understanding bargaining 
and the importance of outside options. What differs between them is 
the “standard,” or reference, case that serves to generate the main 
intuitions guiding the theory. 
 Two basic principles motivate the operation of bargaining models. 
The first basic principle in the political science literature of bargain-
ing games is that the more unattractive the reversion to a party, the 
larger the range of options it will accept.127  The second basic princi-
                                                                                                                      
 124. See supra Part III.C. 
 125. See John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 5-9 (1990) (suggesting that statutory policymaking 
creates a preexisting status quo which affects subsequent policymaking by an agency or 
the president).  
 126. See id. at 6-9 (suggesting agency action is often geared toward the median voter in 
Congress so as to appeal to a majority and thus increase the odds that such action will take 
effect). See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS (1998) (recognizing that winning 
coalitions in politics are almost always greater than minimum-majority size and providing 
a theory of who or what is pivotal in U.S. lawmaking—that is, the person or thing on or 
around which majoritarian lawmaking depends).  
 127. See generally Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On 
the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy, 93 Q.J. ECON. 563 (1979).  
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ple is that the structure of decision rules influences bargains that can 
be reached.128  
 For American national institutions the consequence of these two 
notions has been gridlock, as summarized by Keith Krehbiel in his 
book, Pivotal Politics.129 In that study he shows that there is a large 
set of outcomes, which he calls the gridlock interval, that cannot be 
overturned by ordinary (Article I, Sections 5 and 7) procedures.130 
That set is defined on one side by the size a sufficient majority to 
sustain a presidential veto (one-third of either the House or Senate) 
and, on the other, by the majority required to prevent a cloture vote 
against a filibuster threat in the Senate (nowadays forty Senators 
but who knows how long that will last). Typically this is a large set 
that contains many outcomes that majorities of one or the other 
chamber find unacceptable. 
B.   Majoritarian and Penalty Defaults Reexamined 
 The implications of this line of research complicate default rule 
thinking. To make this point, we focus on two sorts of defaults, ma-
joritarian and penalty. Majoritarian defaults involve courts deferring 
to more majoritarian institutions, in order to further democratic val-
ues. Penalty defaults for this reason may seem problematic, as they 
involve courts forcing majoritarian institutions to act. We intend to 
problematize both of these assumptions. 
 In light of bargaining models, majoritarian default analysis be-
comes ambiguous. Take the instance in which the Supreme Court de-
fers to a preexisting norm. It could be that the norm’s existence re-
flects majoritarian sentiment, but it equally could be the case that 
the norm is simply sitting in the gridlock zone such that it would 
take a supermajoritarian response to move it. In this case the Court 
has compounded the injury by constitutionalizing a norm to which a 
majority would not agree. Consider, for example, the Court’s recent 
decision not to constitutionalize euthanasia.131 The Court’s decision 
rested on an analysis of practice in the fifty states.132 However, it is 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 125, at 5 (stating that the “sequential policy-
making model” provides a strategic structure of policymaking in which bargains are 
reached in pursuit of a specific desired outcome); see also KREHBIEL, supra note 125, at 3-
39 (recognizing that players and procedures play an instrumental role in U.S. lawmaking).  
 129. See KREHBIEL, supra note 126, at 3-19.   
 130. Article I, Section 5 states that congressional chambers are entitled to make their 
own rules; hence, the Senate is free to adopt nonmajoritarian rules and therefore to permit 
filibusters that can be ended only with the concurrence of sixty Senators. See U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 5, cl. 2. Article I, Section 7 specifies the required congressional majority to override a veto. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. These two sections jointly define the gridlock interval. 
 131. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
 132. Id. at 710 (“We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation’s 
history, legal traditions, and practices.” (citations omitted)).  
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entirely possible that state rules rest in the gridlock zone and cannot 
be changed easily even if majority sentiment favored euthanasia un-
der limited circumstances.  
 Common sense tells us that default outcomes in the gridlock region 
may penalize ordinary majorities of either the population as a whole or 
of the Congress. Such outcomes cannot be overturned, so they will be 
sustained politically even though there are ordinary majorities that 
would be willing to overturn them. These decisions become some sort 
of super penalty default: we might call these penalizing defaults and 
note that such outcomes are presumably unattractive.  
 Ironically, the problem is even greater if the Court makes a deci-
sion that protects liberty and thereby limits government’s freedom of 
movement. In the euthanasia case, majority sentiment ultimately 
could move in such a way as to lead to a new constitutional rule. 
Many rules involving sexual autonomy or criminal procedure have 
evolved in just this way.133 But when the Court adopts a constitu-
tional norm that limits government regulation based on majority 
sentiment, constitutional change is frozen. Suppose, based on a 
change in state practice (ostensibly reflecting majority sentiment), 
the Court were ultimately to find a limited right to euthanasia. Just 
as majority sentiment shifted in a way that led the Court to permit 
the practice, so it could theoretically shift in favor of banning it 
again. Yet, the very existence of the Court’s rule would bar states 
from changing their practices in response to majority (or super-
majority) sentiment, making it harder for the Court to see such a 
shift in public views. Such rules tend to operate as a one-way ratchet. 
 This reasoning does suggest somewhat greater caution on the 
Court’s part before it constitutionalizes a rule limiting government’s 
regulatory authority. It also raises cautions about the entire ap-
proach. If the Court’s decisions in cases such as these are, in fact, 
premised on majoritarian principles, deferring to practices that are 
themselves subject to pivotal politics simply may be inapt. The 
Court’s antennae simply may not be attuned to what positive theory 
can teach us about how ostensibly majoritarian politics operates. At 
the least, the Court perhaps ought to limit the use of this approach to 
cases where a very large majority exists, especially when it is consti-
tutionalizing a rule that limits government’s regulatory authority 
 The opposite problem arises in the case of penalty defaults: from 
the standpoint of the designer, penalty defaults are not supposed to 
be played in “equilibrium.”  Indeed, this seems part of the definition 
                                                                                                                      
 133. Compare, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that Georgia’s 
sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental right of homosexuals), with Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers, finding laws criminalizing certain intimate 
sexual conduct between two consenting adults of the same sex unconstitutional).  
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of a penalty default (as opposed to a default that is merely punishing 
one or more of the parties). The whole point of a penalty default is to 
force the parties to contract around it, perhaps disclosing privately 
held information to the other parties, and this implies the resulting 
legislation has desirable properties.134 It also requires the resulting 
legislation to be feasible.  
 By definition, the parties cannot contract around defaults inside 
the gridlock interval, so no such default could work as a penalty de-
fault. Rather, it might work as a penalizing default. This might ex-
plain the curious failure of any governmental body of which we are 
aware to adopt interrogation procedures to replace the Miranda rule. 
As we discussed above, Miranda—at least on its face—was a plain 
invitation to governments to come up with alternative procedures to 
safeguard voluntary confessions.135 Perhaps no government did so be-
cause Miranda—though undesirable—fell within the gridlock zone. 
Alternative hypotheses are available, of course. Perhaps the Court 
recognized this and purposely set the policy where it did as a norma-
tive default. Or, perhaps the Court is quite agile politically and set 
the default in just the right place: despite rhetoric challenging 
Miranda, many officials have not really found the decision so debili-
tating.136 These arguments suggest that the politics of default rules is 
complex and, further, that those who seek to set such rules have rea-
son to be cautious in employing penalty defaults. Lacking informa-
tion about the gridlock region, such defaults seem likely to lead to 
normatively unattractive outcomes. 
 Ironically, then, the way to make penalty defaults work may sim-
ply be to move policy so far to one extreme or another that it falls 
outside the gridlock zone and motivates the parties to act. Our sug-
gestion above, that the Rasul Court might simply have ordered the 
release of all the Guantanamo prisoners, might have seemed far-
fetched. How would the Court be justified in taking such draconian 
action? But draconian action might be just the thing to force Con-
gress out of gridlock. The questions of detention and process involved 
in Guantanamo have proven to be extremely important to this coun-
try’s international standing. A draconian remedy might have fostered 
needed congressional debate.  
 Deliberation-forcing defaults of this sort could find much broader 
use within constitutional law. In the area of sexual privacy, for ex-
ample, some commentators have suggested the Court would have 
done better to rely on desuetude as a basis for decision, rather than 
                                                                                                                      
 134. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.  
 135. See cases discussed supra note 111.  
 136. See generally Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-
First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000 (2001) (concluding that Miranda has had a very lim-
ited impact (positive or negative) on the criminal justice system).  
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adopting a substantive rule.137 In Griswold v. Connecticut, for exam-
ple, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that banned mar-
ried couples from using contraceptives. But there had been no prose-
cution under the statute for years, and the discussion of majoritarian 
defaults suggests why assuming state practices represent majority 
will might be an error. In cases such as this, with longstanding stat-
utes of a recently controversial nature, the Court might simply strike 
the law relying on desuetude, leaving it to the state legislature to de-
cide whether to reenact it. Think of this as a sort of constitutional 
sunset provision. If the law is in fact popular, this sort of judicial ac-
tion will serve as a penalty default, revealing that information. Obvi-
ously the idea needs working out, but positive politics suggests it 
needs to be.  
 Similarly, the Supreme Court has described a general preference 
that police conducting searches possess warrants, but the warrant 
requirement is now riddled with exceptions, in part because of the 
inexorable pressure of cases featuring bad guys who will go free if the 
requirement is enforced. The Court faces a seeming Hobson’s choice. 
On the one hand it can, as it has, cave on a case-by-case basis to po-
lice demands that certain practices be permitted. On the other, it can 
invalidate police practices, let bad types go, and face the possibility of 
public wrath. Moreover, even if the Court wanted to stick to its guns, 
the Court might not itself have enough information to know if war-
rant exceptions are required for the police to do their job. But there is 
a third alternative: the Court could deny approval to unwarranted 
searches—at least absent exigent circumstances—unless those types 
of searches are sanctioned by the proper representative body. This 
sort of rule could help the Court in ascertaining public support for 
the practices, as well as necessity.138 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Default rule thinking in constitutional law has its own set of com-
plexities, distinct from those in private law. At the same time, we hope 
to have demonstrated that such thinking may not be optional. To the 
                                                                                                                      
 137. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 148-56 (1962); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE 
AGE OF STATUTES 5-7 (1982); Calabresi, supra note 81, at 1115-19.  
 138. More narrowly, the Court could require legislative authority for regulatory 
searches. One of the truly confounding aspects of the Fourth Amendment is how to apply 
its strictures when the purpose of a search seems to be regulatory, aimed at deterrence, 
rather than evidence-detecting based on cause. Examples include drunk-driving roadblocks 
and workplace safety inspections. There is a natural police tendency to use whatever tool 
at their means, leading to a distortion of the regulatory purposes of such searches. The 
Court has had an extremely difficult time fitting its regulatory search doctrines alongside 
its crime-detection warrant jurisprudence. A solution, again, would be to permit regulatory 
searches approved by legislative bodies. 
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extent default thinking can embrace the set of options governmental 
actors face in response to judicial decisions, our point is that how a 
case is decided will influence the subsequent conduct. Courts (and 
commentators) ought to pay attention to these options, for they can 
have a great impact on both constitutional law and constitutional poli-
tics. At the least, we hope to have shown that the use of majoritarian 
defaults—while common—is quite problematic. We also hope to have 
raised the intriguing question of whether judicial remedies in default 
cases ought not to be more activist, to the end of energizing political 
responses. Although this notion can raise complicated questions of 
agenda-setting, in light of the difficulty with deferring to supposed ma-
jorities, these sorts of questions may be unavoidable. 
